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THE AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES OF




The late Professor Elliott CheathamI was fond of saying that it was
impossible to have any meaningful discussion about the relative status
of various rules of law within a legal system unless careful attention
was paid to the sources of those rules.2 This statement is especially
accurate when applied to academic and governmental efforts to de-
scribe the role of public international law in governmental decision
making in the United States. Many of these discussions have not been
models of analytical clarity. This article attempts to avoid these pit-
falls by suggesting an analytical framework to clarify some of the con-
ceptual interrelationships between the various forms of legal decision
making implicated in that process.
In this discussion, I distinguish the authoritative source of law
from the substantial source of law. The authoritative source of law is
the political body that confers authority on the decision maker to se-
lect and interpret the rule. By doing this that body politic creates the
authority that gives the rule status as a rule of law in the forum of
decision. The substantial source of a legal rule is that body of law in
which the rule's original policy bases and the verbal form that de-
scribes the effect to be given to that policy are found. The substantial
* David Daniels Allen Distinguished Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
I wish to express my great appreciation to Ms. Michelle Behaylo, J.D. '90, for her excellent
research assistance.
Preparation of this article was supported by a grant from Vanderbilt University School of
Law.
1. Cheatham, a professor of law at Columbia University Law School during most of his life,
finished his career at Vanderbilt Law School in 1972. He was, of course, a conflict of laws
scholar. His preference for clear and precise analysis as well as his fundamental courtesy and
willingness to evaluate even contrary opinions objectively and on the merits make his work a
useful model, not only for its substance but for its scholarly tone as well. This was an attribute
that he shared with his good friend Professor William Bishop. Professor Bishop once told me
that he and Cheatham met most often, together with their wives, "accidentally" at the local art
museum in whichever city was hosting the annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools. "Playing hookey," Bishop called it - a tribute, in my view, rather to Bishop's and
Cheatham's good taste and sense of the order of things.
2. See, e.g., Cheatham & Maier, Private International Law and Its Sources, 22 VAND. L.
REv. 27 (1968).
Authoritative Sources
source of the rule is not necessarily the same political body or unit that
is its authoritative source. I distinguish both these sources from the
energizing forces that stimulate the legal dynamic. Those forces are
the combined felt community needs that give life to every rule of law
and justify its continued use as a guide to authoritative decision
making.
I also address the question, if international law is "part of the law
of the United States," what must that statement necessarily mean
about the status of international legal rules in United States courts in
the light of the conclusions reached about the authoritative source of
those rules. In this discussion, I have attempted to avoid both the
unhelpful abstractions and the not so glittering generalities that some-
times characterize scholarly discussion of these questions. This essay
inquires about the role of customary international law in providing
authoritative limits on the internal exercise of governmental authority
otherwise conferred upon United States officials, including courts, by
the United States Constitution.
That question contains many subsidiary questions. One is whether
the customary practice of nations accepted as law by the world com-
munity is, of itself, also evidence of federal law in the United States. If
customary international law is evidence of authoritative federal norms,
where do those norms fall within the federal hierarchy and what room
does this leave for the policy input of the national decision maker in
making use of those norms? In other words, is customary international
law subject to modification for internal purposes in the same manner
that federal statutes, federal common law and even international trea-
ties are subject to modification? Or is it, because of its special origin,
truly "a mystic overlaw to which even the United States must bow"?
3
If customary international law is not an evidence of federal law but
has legal force of its own without the need for specific incorporation,
does it have an exalted place in the hierarchy of United States law? In
other words, is it the law of the United States over all matters to which
it applies other than provisions of the United States Constitution? If
the answer to this last question is,"yes," are customary international
legal rules nonetheless subject to modification or supersession for in-
ternal purposes by the exercise of the powers conferred on the
branches of the national government by the Constitution? Or, does
3. The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1922) (Holmes, J.). In this admiralty case,
Holmes answered the question realistically. "When a case is said to be governed by foreign law
or by general maritime law that is only a short way of saying that for this purpose the sovereign
power takes up a rule suggested from without and makes it part of its own rules." Id. at 432. See
infra text accompanying notes 16-20.
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the Constitution contemplate that customary international law holds a
special and higher position than other forms of federal law, making it
not subject to modification by means of ordinary law-creating
processes of the federal government?
Lastly, is customary international law itself an authoritative source
of law in the United States, superior in U.S. courts to domestic author-
ity conferred on the political and judicial branches by the United
States Constitution as to those matters to which it applies?
To address all of these questions adequately would require discus-
sion beyond the scope of the present analysis. Many of these questions
have been addressed, although often without great clarity, in the liter-
ature. This article seeks to provide an analytical framework for deal-
ing with these questions by addressing the more encompassing
question, what is the authoritative source of customary international
law in the United States?
4
II. THE SOURCES OF LAW DISTINGUISHED
Before beginning this analysis, a more precise definition of the
terms "authoritative sources", "substantial sources" and "energizing
forces" as used here is necessary. 5 The authoritative source of a rule
of law is that body politic that confers authority on the decision maker
to "apply" the rule as a guide to decision and thereby gives the rule its
status as "law" in that body politic. By conferring such authority,
that body politic legitimates the use of the rule by its government offi-
cials, including courts, as a guide to deciding the rights of the populace
or the scope of government authority.
In the United States, for example, the authoritative source for a
decision may be one of many bodies politic: a city or county, a state,
or the entire nation. One important role of the United States Constitu-
tion is to designate these authoritative sources and to determine, in the
event of a conflict between decision makers, whose policies shall con-
trol. 6 The Constitution explicitly provides that the authority of state
4. The authoritative role of treaties in United States law is directly confirmed by the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution. I do not, therefore, discuss
the theoretical source of international treaty law in the United States. For an excellent discus-
sion of the relationship between treaties and customary international law in the international
context, see Weisburd, Customary International Law. The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J.
TRANS. L. 1 (1988).
5. These concepts have a rough parallel in Aristotle's classification of sources. Under that
classification (material, formal, efficient, final) the authoritative sources would be the "formal"
sources, the substantial sources would be the "material" sources and the "energizing forces"
would be the "efficient" sources. See Cheatham & Maier, supra note 2, at 95 n.267.
6. In fact, it was the conflict of authority between the states and the nation and among the
several states themselves under the Articles of Confederation that led to the Constitutional Con-
[V/ol. 10:450
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law can always be displaced when the central government has acted
appropriately within its power.7 Thus, the authoritative source of fed-
eral law is the national body politic. The same analytical framework
can be used to describe the divisions of power among the federal
branches. The Constitution is, however, less explicit about those inter-
branch divisions of power, especially in the area of foreign affairs. 8
Nonetheless, the national body politic is the authoritative source of
that law. It speaks through the federal Constitution.
A more functional way of putting the question about the authorita-
tive source of a given rule of law is as follows. Does the decision-
making body, authorized to make the decision by a given body politic,
have the authority to change or reinterpret the content of the rule to
give effect to the policies of that body politic when it adopts that rule
as a guide to decision? In the United States, these decision makers
may be officials of the executive, the legislature, or the courts. When
dealing with international law, if the answer to the above question is
"yes," then it is the law of the United States, the same law that em-
powers the institution to make the law selection and thereby gives au-
thority to its decisions. Thus, the national body politic, not the world
community, is the authoritative source of the result arrived at and
thus, Of the law in that situation.
On the other hand, if an institution in the United States does not
have authority in its own forum by virtue of its constitutionally con-
ferred powers to interpret the international legal rule in question for
domestic application in the light of United States policies, then the
authoritative source of that rule is the international community. In
that situation, any change in the substantive content and, therefore, of
the result to be reached under the guidance of the rule would have to
be brought about by action of that community, not by the act of a
domestic decision-maker. 9
Put another way, it is clear that the world community is the au-
vention of 1787. When it became clear that these questions of authority could not be addressed
adequately within the framework of the Articles, the Convention addressed itself to the develop-
ment of a new structure to deal with them directly. I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION 18-27 (M. Farrand ed. 1937); See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
SECS. 259-60 (2d ed. 1851); C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 567 (1928).
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
8. Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 424 (1964); See E. CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957 171 (1957). But see Henkin, The Foreign Affairs
Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805, 811-19 (1964).
9. "It is not of course the unilateral claims but rather the reciprocal tolerance of the external
decision-makers which create the expectations of pattern and uniformity in decision, of practice
in accord with rule, commonly regarded as law." McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the
International Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356, 358 n.7 (1955).
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thoritative source of the rules of international law when they are ap-
plied in world community fora because those fora can interpret and
vary the content of those rules in their search for community con-
sent.10 Those fora, especially the forum of diplomacy, can incre-
mentally change the content of those rules by authoritative
interpretation or by the demand-response accommodation process that
characterizes customary law-formation."1 International adjudicators,
although theoretically acting only as conduits to give effect to commu-
nity consent, also necessarily exercise influence over the content of in-
ternational law by the emphasis that they give to various indicia of
that consent in the process of arriving at a decision about what the law
"is." Conversely, it is the domestic law that determines whether a
given internal decision maker has the authority to decide that the mu-
nicipal body politic will violate its legal duties to other members of the
world community.
A more practical form of the question, what is the authoritative
source of a rule of law, is, "In what set of books is the lawyer most
likely to find accurate guidance to predict the acts of a given decision
maker?" Should the lawyer search the prior case reports of the do-
mestic court, or the opinions of international scholars and the prior
case reports of international tribunals to determine which result a do-
mestic court will likely reach in a given case? If prior domestic deci-
sions provide the most accurate guidance, then the authoritative
source of the decision and, hence, of the rules that are its guides is
domestic law. If customary acts of the world community, especially as
identified and characterized by international tribunals, provide the
most accurate guidance to the likely domestic decision, then the au-
thoritative source of the law is international law.' 2
10. This analysis avoids the fallacy that treats rules of international law as if their application
were in some sense mechanically "determined" by community consent, ignoring the influence of
the decision maker's values on the result in the individual case. Although such a metaphysical
view of law may be of some utility in hortatory discussions, lawyers who deal with law as a
practical tool must recognize that the use of any rule by a decision maker as a guide to decision
necessarily includes some reflection of that decision maker's values in the result achieved under
that rule's guidance. Cf. Erie R.R. v.Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
To the extent that the decision maker has authority, the decision is authoritative. The rule of
law is therefore a strong guide to, but not the sole influence on, the result achieved. Failure to
recognize this fundamental truth about rules of law, including rules of international law, leads to
some of the unfocused discussion that characterizes many of the colloquies about the role of
international law in national decision making. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, The Authority of the
United States Executive to Interpret, Articulate or Violate the Norms of International Law, 1986
PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 297-308, passim.
11. McDougal, supra note 9, at 357.
12. In the United States, of course, courts, when interpreting an unclear piece of federal
legislation will attempt to interpret it in a way that will not violate international law. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (1987). This
is a rule of legislative construction whose purpose is to insure that courts do not accidentally, by
[Vol. 10:450
Authoritative Sources
This essay concludes that both the governmental structure of the
United States and the functional nature of international law itself com-
pel the conclusion that the authoritative source of public international
law in the United States is the will of the United States body politic as
reflected in federal law - common law, statutory law or constitutional
law 13 - not the will of the world community of nations. There is no
doubt that the United States is obligated in the world community to
comply with public international law. It is equally clear that each in-
dividual nation in that community, including the United States, must
have the power (but not the international authority) to violate interna-
tional law. This proposition is fundamental to the concept of absolute
territorial sovereignty; and territorial sovereignty is, itself, a sine qua
non for a consentual legal system and for fixing practical responsibility
for compliance with the norms created by that community consent. 14
Part of nationhood in such a system must be possession of the in-
ternal authority to decide whether to violate international obligations.
Whether a nation has elected to exercise that power is determined by
reviewing the validity of its internal decision-making processes under
municipal law. To suggest that the rule of international law that a
nation is deciding to violate controls the internal legitimacy of the pro-
cess by which that decision is reached is fundamentally nonsensical. It
is this functional reality, as much as any language of the courts or of
the Constitution, that supports the proposition that United States de-
cision makers are not bound by the Constitution to apply rules of cus-
tomary international law in domestic fora.15
The ensuing analysis also requires that the authoritative source of
a legal rule be carefully distinguished from its "substantial source."
exercising the judicial power, put the United States in violation of its international obligations
when that result was not intended by the political branches. Under this rule of construction,
however, it is clear that the court's search of international authorities is carried out to serve the
domestic constitutional principle of separation of powers, not to give effect to substantive interna-
tional community policy for its own sake.
13. The problem is not, of course, one faced solely by the United States, and the solution is
different in the internal law of other nations. See, eg., Bundesverfassungsgesetz art. 25 (Consti-
tution of the Federal Republic of Germany), making international law supreme in internal Ger-
man decision making.
14. See Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMp. L. 579,
584-85 (1983).
15. Professor Stewart Jay puts it nicely: "The obligations of the United States to foreign
states and their citizens mainly are defined principally in the international arena; the extent to
which American law acknowledges the law of nations is largely irrelevant. Domestically ... the
issue [of whether to apply international law domestically] always revolves around an initial deci-
sion of whether to constrain our own institutions. This judgment turns on deciding which
branch of government should have the power to interpret the law of nations, or to depart from
it .. " Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819,
848 (1989). See also Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND L. REV.
1205 (1988).
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The substantial source, as I use the term, is the body of law to which
we look to determine the content of the rule - its verbal form and the
meaning of those words for that body politic's decision makers. The
body of law that is the substantial source of the rule is not necessarily
created by the same body politic that makes the rule authoritative for
purposes of the case or situation before the local decision maker.
An excellent illustration is drawn from the field of conflict of laws.
When the forum elects to "apply" the law of a foreign jurisdiction, it
uses that jurisdiction's rule as a model for its own decision - as the
substantial source of the law applied. Its decision does not become
law for the body politic from which the rule was copied. The body
politic of the forum remains the authoritative source of the law in that
situation because it is only by virtue of the forum's decision-making
authority that the substance of the foreign rule can have any legal ef-
fect in the forum's territory. In other words, it is solely the forum's
authority that permits the content of the foreign rule to function as
law in the forum in the first place.16 Conversely, the forum's decision
does not create precedent in the foreign system from which the rule
was taken. The forum's decision has only whatever persuasive effect
in the foreign system that the decision makers in that system may de-
cide to give it. In other words, the borrowing sovereign's "applica-
tion" of the borrowed rule is not an authoritative source of the content
of that rule for the body politic from whose law it was borrowed.
This analysis is no less accurate when forum courts "apply" cus-
tomary international law. 17 The very consentual nature of interna-
tional legal rules makes it clear that they can have no applicability
within a nation's legal system without the active affirmative participa-
tion of that nation's authoritative decision-makers.' 8
This principle of forum authority derives from the public interna-
tional law concept of absolute territorial sovereignty on which the fun-
damental principle of territorial jurisdiction - thus, the very existence
of a body of law governing relationships between nation-states - de-
pends. 19 There is no doubt, however, that public international law is
16. See generally, e.g., W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1924).
17. See, The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812). Cf
Comments by Rubin and Crawford, 1982 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 267.
18. This analysis presumes a dualist system. It is clear that if customary international law is
at the apex of a hierarchy of domestic law, then it is really a super law in the forum, like a
constitution, not a set of rules that national decision makers use as models for domestic decisions.
Evidence that the framers of the Constitution intended this result is weak at best. See Jay, supra
note 15, at 843-48.
19. The principle of absolute territorial authority of the local decision maker was the basis
for the concept of comity that described how it was possible for the law of one jurisdiction to be
[V/ol. 10:450
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the substantial source of the norms that it contains when those norms
are invoked by United States decision makers to support internal law
decisions that the decision maker believes should be guided by interna-
tional legal principles. 20 When those international norms are used in
this way, their substantial source is the body of law called interna-
tional law but their authoritative source - the governmental power
that gives them authority for purposes of the local decision and which
has the authority to determine how they will be used as guides in a
particular case - is the law of the United States.
Sources of law should not be confused with evidences of the law's
normative content. Within each body politic, evidence of the content
of legal rules takes various forms. In the United States, for example,
the United States Constitution identifies the various forms that federal
law may take: the Constitution itself, treaties (and, by customary con-
stitutional practice, other international agreements 21), and other fed-
eral law in all its variousness. 22 The Constitution also designates the
institutions that create those evidences: the legislature, 23 the execu-
tive,24 and the courts.25 These institutions create law, respectively, by
federal legislation, federal executive acts, and federal common law.
26
Taken together, these types of law contain the verbal forms that mani-
fest the national legal norms of conduct.
One of the principal roadblocks to effective analysis is the tendency
applied in another without diminishing the second nation's authority. HUBER, DE CONFLICTU
LEGUM, translated and reprinted in DAVIES, THE INFLUENCE OF HUBER'S DE CONFLICTU
LEGUM ON ENGLISH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 49, 64-78 (1937).
20. A somewhat analogous situation is found in United States Constitutional law in those
cases where a state cites Supreme Court decisions concerning the federal Constitution as persua-
sive authority for the interpretation of parallel provisions in the state constitution. In such a
circumstance, unlike the situation in the international field, the federal Constitution provides a
limit by means of the Supremacy Clause in Article VI to what the state may do. See Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983). That the analogy breaks down here is significant. The
principal difference between the status of federal law in this circumstance and public interna-
tional law in the situation addressed in this article is that the United States Constitution contains
a Supremacy Clause; and public international law does not, except as applied to the external
relationships of states.
21. See generally McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional, Executive or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181 (1945).
22. Cf Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law" Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I.
24. U.S. CONST. art. II.
25. U.S. CONST. art. III. In fact, these are not truly separated powers; rather, the United
States federal branches are separate institutions exercising shared powers. See A.S. MILLER,
THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION 209 (1976).
26. See Maier, The Three Faces of Zapata: Maritime Law, Federal Common Law, Federal
Courts Law, 6 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 387, 387-91 (1973); Cheatham & Maier, supra note 2, at 54-
61. A parallel law-making structure is found within each of the states.
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of analysts to speak and write of law as if that term were synonymous
with "rules." Generally there is no particular harm in speaking and
writing as if written legal rules were themselves "the law." For analyt-
ical purposes, however, it is essential to keep in mind that, at least for
the lawyer, rules of law are useful in direct proportion to the extent
that they serve as reliable evidence of the decisions likely to be made
by future authoritative decision makers. A rule of law is not, there-
fore, in any realistic sense, the law itself. Rather, it is a guide for use
both by future decision makers and those subject to their decisions to
help predict how those authorities will act in given situations. Thus, it
is the acts of decision makers that are functional law for the lawyer,
international and domestic alike, whether he or she be advising a gov-
ernment or a private client.2 7 This reality is made clear by Professors
McDougal and Reisman in the introduction to their international law
casebook. They wrote:
The scholar as well as the lawyer advising a client can do no more than
explain what relevant decisions were made in the past and what relevant
decisions are likely, under different conditions, to be made in the future,
to aid in the clarification of goals and then devise strategy tooled toward
goal realization. 2
8
Other uses of the term "law" project wishful thinking by writers
whose personal notions of how the universe ought to look is not
matched by the realities of the practice that surrounds them.29
Thought of in this way, the law is not a body of rules but a process of
decision making the results of which are described by those rules. The
late Professor Hardy Dillard, who closed his career as a Judge on the
International Court of Justice, put it accurately and well:
Rules of law do not 'exist' in the sense in which a tree or a stone or the
planet Mars might be said to exist. True, they may be articulated and
put on paper and in that form they exist, but, whatever their form, they
are expressed in words which are merely signs mediating human subjec-
tivities. They represent and arouse expectations that are capable of being
explored scientifically. The "law" is thus not a 'something' impelling
obedience; it is a constantly evolving process of decision making and the
way it evolves will depend on the knowledge and insights of the decision
makers. So viewed, norms of law should be considered less as compul-
sive commands than as tools of thought or instruments of analysis.
Their impelling quality will vary greatly depending on the context of
application, and, since the need for stability is recognized, the norms
27. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
28. M. McDOUGAL & W.M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PER-
SPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY, CASES AND MATERIALS Xviii
(1981).




may frequently provide a high order of predictability. But this is refera-
ble back to the expectations entertained and is not attributable to some
existential quality attaching to the norms themselves. In other words,
our concept of 'law' needs to be liberated from the cramping assumption
that it 'exists' as a kind of 'entity' imposing restraints on the decision
maker.
30
Thus, when a court or other decision maker "applies law" it selects
a set of social policies to guide its decision on the issue before it. It is
the authority of the decision maker to decide that makes the decision,
the policies it reflects and, hence, the rules that describe those policies,
authoritative; not some metaphysical characteristic of the rules them-
selves. Consequently, as long as a decision maker in the United States
is given authority to decide by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the authoritative source of the decision and, thus, of the "law"
that is "applied" can be attributable solely to the body politic that
conferred that decision making authority upon the decision maker.
Put another way, if the Constitution and laws of the United States
confer upon a judge or other official the authority to make a decision,
the authoritative source of that decision must be the law of the United
States regardless of the body of rules from which the verbal formula
and the policies it describes may be borrowed.
Insofar as international law is concerned, the United States deci-
sion maker may very well treat customary international law as the
substantial source of the rule that the decision maker applies, but the
act of selecting the rule, interpreting it and applying it is the authorita-
tive act in that domestic forum, not the acts of the international com-
munity that create the custom. Conversely, when an international
forum - the forum of diplomacy or of adjudication - uses an inter-
national legal rule as its guide to decision, the authoritative source of
that decision is that forum, empowered and authorized by processes
legitimated by the international community, not some abstract
overlaw that in some sense compels a particular result.
Domestic decision makers in international cases are not auto-
matons, making decisions mechanically by applying international legal
rules, any more than they are automatons when they decide purely
domestic issues. The content of customary international law is even
more amorphous and, therefore, even more subject to interpretations
reflecting the policy preferences of the decision makers who use it as a
guide to authoritative decision than is domestic law. The multiple
opinions handed down by the International Court of Justice in virtu-
ally every case dispel any suggestion that customary international law
30. Dillard, The Policy Oriented Approach to Law, 40 VA. Q. REV. 626, 629 (1964).
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is either easily determined or may be mechanically applied without
reference to the policy preferences of the decision maker. To suggest
otherwise is to ignore the accuracy of Professor Myers McDougal's
famous dictum, not yet successfully challenged in the literature after
more than 30 years. Referring to the international law of the sea, but
clearly not limiting the scope of his comments to that subject mattter,
he wrote:
From the perspective of realistic description, the international law of the
sea is not a mere static body of rules but is rather a whole decision-
making process, a public order which includes a structure of authorized
decision-makers as well as a body of highly flexible, inherited prescrip-
tions. It is, in other words, a process of continuous interaction, of con-
tinuous demand and response, in which the decision-makers of
particular nation states unilaterally put forward claims of the most di-
verse and conflicting character to the use of the world's seas, and in
which other decision-makers, external to the demanding state and in-
cluding both national and international officials, weigh and appraise
these competing claims in terms of the interests of the world community
and of the rival claimants, and ultimately accept or reject them.
3'
Some writers suggest that international law ought to be authorita-
tive in the United States and therefore that any constitutionally cre-
ated power of the United States courts, the Congress and the
Executive Branch must be exercised in accordance with it as a matter
of jurisprudential fiat. 32 No scholar has yet successfully demonstrated
that the United States' government's decision-making authority, or
that of any of its branches, was conferred by the people subject to the
limitations created by an international legal regime. 33 Such a result
could only be achieved in a system in which international law stood at
the apex of a normative hierarchy. That cannot be true as long as the
authority of domestic decision makers derives from the judgment of
the domestic body politic as reflected in the Constitution, not from the
international community.34 Whenever there is a conflict between the
will of the people, reflected by the act of their governmental institu-
31. McDougal, supra note 9, at 356-57. Professor Bishop was a great admirer of Professor
McDougal's work. A few years before his death he said that he wished that the law-science-
policy school of jurisprudence that McDougal founded had not adopted a special vocabulary for
its work because difficulties in accurate translation had made Professor McDougal's analyses less
accessible to non-English speaking scholars. Conversation between Professor Bishop and this
writer while walking to an art museum in Washington, D.C. in 1982.
32. See, e.g. Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and
International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1130-34 (1985).
33. For analysis demonstrating precisely the opposite conclusion, see generally Jay, supra
note 15.
34. Weisburd, supra note 15, at 1205, is an excellent article demonstrating that 18th and 19th
Century cases and other authorities do not support the conclusion that international law is part
of the hierarchy of United States law although it is a source of reference for judicial decision.
[Vol. 10:450
Authoritative Sources
tions, and the will of the international community reflected in custom-
ary international law, the muncipal will must necessarily control the
internal content of the institutional decisions made.
The principal question is, therefore, whether the United States
Constitution has incorporated the entire international legal regime
into the hierarchy of United States law. Evidence suggests that such
incorporation was not intended by the framers. 35 The little U.S. case
law that exists on the subject suggests that such an incorporation has
not taken place.36 The authority of domestic decision makers is not
subject to limitation in domestic fora by an international community
rule until that rule is incorporated into United States law. Once it is
so incorporated, the rule has whatever authority is attributable to the
decisions of the institution of government that accomplished the incor-
poration - the legislative, the judicial or the executive branch. Under
the Constitution, it can have neither more nor less. As Professor
Louis Henkin has put it: "[C]ustomary international law is law for the
Executive and the court to apply, but the Constitution does not forbid
the President (or the Congress) to violate international law, and the
courts will give effect to acts within the constitutional powers of the
political branches without regard to international law."
37
III. Two IMPORTANT CASES
Two well-known cases are illustrative, The Paquete Habana 38 and
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.39 In The Paquete Habana, the
President of the United States ordered a naval blockade of the Cuban
coast "in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and the law of
nations applicable in such cases." 4° While the blockade was in pro-
gress, the commander of the U.S. naval forces off Cuba sought permis-
sion from the Navy Department to take Spanish vessels returning to
Cuba from Florida fishing grounds and to detain their crews as prison-
ers of war. The Navy responded that any such vessel "attempting to
violate the blockade" was subject to capture. 41 The commander cap-
35. See generally Jay, supra note 15.
36. See generally Weisburd, supra note 15, at 1205; cf Testimony of Professor Louis Henkin,
infra text accompanying note 120.
37. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 221-22 (1972). Accord, Hen-
kin, Testimony on Cross Examination in Garcia-Mir v. Smith, Civ. Acts: C81-938A, C81-1084A,
C81-1350A, N.D. Georgia, Trial Transcript, at 56 (1986) (copy in the author's files) [hereinafter
Henkin Testimony].
38. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
39. 376 U.S. 398, 424 (1964).
40. 175 U.S. at 712.
41. Id. at 713.
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tured two coastal fishing vessels which were sold as prize. In this suit
by the former owners, the U.S. Supreme Court, sitting as a prize court,
found that the vessels had been captured in violation of international
law and that therefore the proceeds from their sale had to be returned
to plaintiffs.
It was in this context that the Supreme Court made its famous
statement that international law is part of the law of the United States
and that courts when called upon to apply it would do so where there
was "no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision."
'42
Since the President had ordered the blockade to be conducted in ac-
cordance with international law, there was no conflict between the
"controlling executive act" which was the President's order and the
Court's version of the international law of prize. Any seizure in viola-
tion of international law was unauthorized as a matter of domestic law
because the President, as Commander-in-Chief, had incorporated by
reference the limitations found in international law into the authority
he conferred on United States naval forces. 43 The opinion is clear that
had the President ordered naval forces to carry out the blockade in
accordance with practices that would violate international law, the
Court would have nevertheless recognized the legal validity of such an
order.44
In Sabbatino, the Cuban central bank sued the receiver of a United
States corporation to recover the proceeds from the sale of sugar that
the Cubans claimed to have expropriated while it was on board ship in
a Cuban harbor. The plaintiffs relied on the act of state doctrine, the
rule that a United States court will not question the validity of an act
of a foreign nation done within its own territory. 45 Defendant argued
that the doctrine did not apply because the expropriation had been
without compensation and therefore violated international law. The
Court ruled that the doctrine was one of federal common law, derived
from the principle of separation of powers.
46
First, the Court found that the act of state doctrine was not re-
quired by rules of public international law. Then the Court refused to
apply the international law rule that private parties with claims
against foreign governments must exhaust local remedies; then, if un-
42. Id. at 700.
43. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454 (11th Cir. 1986).
44. See supra text accompanying note 40.
45. 376 U.S. at 416 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)); see Hatch v.
Baez, 14 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 596, 599-600 (N.Y. App. Div. 1876).
46. 376 U.S. at 425-27. See Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common Law in Private
International Matters, 5 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 133, 159-61 (1971). Cf Henkin, International Law
as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1559-60 (1984).
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successful, seek redress through government to government negotia-
tion. The Court wrote: "Although it is of course true that United
States courts apply international law as a part of our own in appropri-
ate circumstances..., the public law of nations can hardly dictate to a
country which is in theory wronged how to treat that wrong within its
domestic borders.
47
The Court then. refused to determine whether the uncompensated
taking violated international law. The Court made it clear that it did
not consider international law to be part of the law of the United
States in the sense that United States courts must find and apply it as
they would have to do if international legal rules had the same status
as other forms of United States law. 48 Rather, the court's refusal to
decide was grounded firmly on federal separation of powers considera-
tions. Taken together, these cases make it clear that, whatever may
have been the case in 1789, modern decisions by United States courts
based on principles of customary international law derive their author-
ity from the United States body politic, even though their substantial
source may be the rules of customary international law. 49 No modern
Supreme Court cases suggest otherwise. In other words, the interna-
tional legal regime is not incorporated into United States law. 50
Both the authoritative sources and the substantial sources of law
must be further distinguished from what Chief Justice Harlan Stone
called the law's "energizing forces." 5' 1 These forces are the felt needs
of national or international society that are the raison d'etre for the
norms that the rules of law describe. It is these forces that encourage
the creation of, or changes in, legal norms and that inform the inter-
pretation of the rules that embody those norms. It is the perception of
these forces and their evaluation by an authoritative decision maker
that molds and changes the law as it is applied. To suggest that the
rules of any legal system can be given effect without careful attention
to these forces by the institution charged to decide is to misunderstand
the nature of legal decision making.
47. 376 U.S. at 423 (citations omitted).
48. Id. at 431-32.
49. See Jay, supra note 15, at 830-833.
50. The above discussion reflects, of course; a baldly utilitarian approach to legal decision
making. The alternative is a recourse to natural law whose heavy reliance on revealed truth
provides less than effective guidance for the solution of real world problems. See Epstein, The
Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y - (1989) (forthcoming).
Professor Epstein points out that the conclusions suggested by natural law theory are equally
accountable under utilitarian analysis without the need to rely upon the analyst's intuition as an
authoritative determinant.
51. Stone, The Future of Legal Education, 10 A.B.A. J. 233, 234 (1924).
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IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. LAW
The remainder of this discussion focuses on two recent legal events
that demonstrate the difficulties which arise when analysts fail to iden-
tify clearly the authoritative sources of the international legal rules
that they urge upon United States decision makers. One of these
events was the American Law Institute's ("ALI") preparation and
publication of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States from 1979 through 1987. The other event is the series of
domestic court cases dealing with the applicability of the international
law of human rights in United States courts to the incarceration of the
Mariel boatlift Cubans in federal prisons pursuant to executive
regulations.
V. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
The development of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States52 was extremely contentious, both within the
American Law Institute and, especially, between the Institute and the
United States Departments of Justice and State.53 Ambiguity in iden-
tifying the authoritative source of public international legal rules in
United States law, especially in the early drafts, led to serious misgiv-
ings on the part of the U.S. Government and ultimately to an unprece-
dented intervention by those departments into the ALI's decision
making process. 5
4
Tentative Draft No. 155 was an early signal that the issue of au-
thoritative sources would not be addressed with clarity when it de-
52. American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (1987). Professor Louis Henkin of Columbia University Law School was the
Chief Reporter. Associate Reporters were Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, New York University
Law School; Professor Louis Sohn, University of Georgia Law School; and Professor Detlev
Vagts, Harvard University Law School. These Reporters first prepared five tentative drafts of
the Restatement, approximately one a year. These drafts were each first submitted for discussion
to a group of Advisors consisting of other academicians, practitioners and present and former
United States Legal Advisers appointed for that purpose, then to the Council of the American
Law Institute, and finally to the membership as a whole for discussion, debate and tentative
acceptance.
53. This writer served as a representative of the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department
of State, in connection with matters related to the Restatement from August, 1983 through May,
1986, first as the Office's Counselor on International Law, then as a special consultant.
54. For a summary discussion of some of the problems involved in preparing the document,
see Maier, Introduction to Panel, Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law: How Were the
Controversies Resolved?, 1987 PROC. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. - (1987) (forthcoming).
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980). Each of the first five Tentative Drafts dealt with different aspects of
the Restatement. Ultimately, the Reporters prepared a Tentative Final Draft containing across-
the-board revisions, then a Tentative Draft No. 7 dealing with certain especially controversial
issues. Despite its title, Tentative Draft No. 7 was actually the draft on these issues penultimate
to the final bound volume. The title, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, was
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scribed the relationship between international law and the law of the
United States as a "mixed" monist-dualist system. The Introductory
Note to Chapter 2, Status of International Law and Agreements in
United States Law, in Tentative Draft No. 1,56 began by characteriz-
ing international law and the law of the United States as two "discrete
legal systems." 57 After describing both the "monist" 58 and "dualist" 59
theories of the relationship between international and domestic legal
systems, the draft appeared to retreat from its earlier statement by
describing the United States system as "mixed," suggesting that in
some instances international law was authoritative of its own force; in
others, solely because it had been "incorporated" into U.S. law. The
draft never directly addressed the nature or degree of the mixture.
Later sections and the accompanying commentary seemed to be unde-
cided about the nature and extent of authority to be accorded custom-
ary international law by United States decision makers as well as
about the appropriate places to search out its content. This lack of
clarity manifested itself in several sections of the early drafts. Two of
the most controversial were the sections dealing with jurisdiction, es-
pecially Section 403, 60 and Section 135,61 dealing with the status of
customary international law in the hierarchy of United States law.
Section 403 represented a departure from earlier legal theory about
the role of the customary international legal limitations in decisions by
United States courts dealing with cases in which the United States and
other nations had concurrent jurisdiction under principles of interna-
tional law. Under Section 40 of the earlier Restatement (Second) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,62 courts resolved juris-
dictional conflicts in concurrent jurisdiction cases by employing the
principle of comity. 63 Under that analysis, the interests of the compet-
ing states were examined to determine whether, in the light of the util-
adopted by the ALI while the book was being prepared for final publication. All drafts are,
therefore, referred to as drafts of the Restatement (Revised).
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) [hereinafter T.D. No. 1].
57. Id. at 39.
58. "Monists" argue that international law is supreme in the hierarchy of law in the United
States, even as the Constitution is supreme over other domestic law..
59. "Dualists" treat international law and United States law as being entirely independent
but congruent systems.
60. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1981) [hereinafter T.D. No. 2].
61. T.D. No. 1, supra note 56, at 64.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 40 (1965).
63. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976);
Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
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ity of encouraging similar reciprocal treatment in a later case, the
United States court should elect not to exercise jurisdiction that it
could otherwise exercise under one or more of the traditional interna-
tional law rules.64 International legal rules were used by United States
courts under the maxim of statutory interpretation that, where the in-
tent of Congress was unclear, a court would interpret the jurisdictional
reach of a statute to comply with the requirements of customary inter-
national law.
This approach prevented the court from an interpretation that
would put the United States in violation of international law when
that was not intended by the political branches. 65 The maxim was
based on separation of powers considerations, not on international
legal principles. When, however, Congress made its intent clear, the
courts would give effect to that intent, even if to do so would result in
a violation of international law.
66
The new section 403 took a different position. It provided that,
even though the United States (or another country) might have juris-
diction under any of the traditional international tests, it could not
exercise such jurisdiction as a matter of international law if it would be
otherwise unreasonable to do so. Furthermore, when two or more na-
tions had concurrent jurisdiction under traditional tests, the nation
whose exercise of jurisdiction was less reasonable in the light of the
considerations set forth in Section 403(2), had to give way, not as a
matter of comity but as a matter of international law. The effect of
this provision was to make the international law of jurisdiction as in-
terpreted by United States courts superior to Congressional enact-
ments. That effect became even more pronounced when the Reporters
dropped Section 403(4) that explicitly recognized the primacy in do-
mestic courts of clear Congressional enactments over customary inter-
national legal prohibitions. The new Section 403 amounted to a
declaration that customary international law, not Congressional enact-
ments, would henceforth be the authoritative source of law for deci-
sions by United States courts trying to resolve concurrent jurisdiction
cases.
This proposed result created serious potential problems for the
United States government. First, under the Restatement (Second) ap-
proach, any decision by a United States court that refused to apply
United States law on grounds of comity raised no inferences about the
64. See Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection between Public
and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 293-96 (1982).




content of the international customary rules limiting the exercise of
jurisdiction. Under the new proposal, every United States judicial de-
cision in a concurrent jurisdiction case would necessarily be viewed by
the international community as a decision applying an international
legal rule, citable as secondary authority in international tribunals
and, more importantly, in international negotiations, as evidence of
the content of customary international law. In these circumstances, it
would become necessary for the Departments of State and Justice to
take an amicus position in every United States case involving concur-
rent jurisdiction to attempt to avoid the creation of an unfavorable
international legal precedent. Not only was such a task onerous but it
would often force the U.S. government to take public positions on is-
sues that might be better handled through quiet diplomacy. Further-
more, information that such a case was before a district court is not
automatically available to the concerned government agencies in time
to intervene.
Second, since the new drafts concluded that decisions of interna-
tional tribunals should be given great weight in determining the con-
tent of international law, the U.S. government ran the risk that an
international tribunal's interpretation of jurisdictional law, even in a
case in which the United States government was not a party, might be
treated as controlling precedent in a United States court attempting to
resolve a similar issue. The Restatement did, of course, note the im-
portance of U.S. government interpretations, but the "great weight"
rule for international adjudications would seriously undermine the
U.S. government's influence.
Third, unlike domestic conflict of laws cases, where U.S. courts
balance governmental interests or determine reasonableness under the
Due Process Clause, reasonableness determinations by international
tribunals would be far too infrequent to build a reliable body of defini-
tive international case law on the topic - thus leading to substantial
uncertainty for a prolonged period of time.
All in all, the proposed Section 403 contained the seeds of a major
redefinition of the authoritative sources of international jurisdiction
law as applied in United States courts. As Judge Malcolm Wilkey
pointed out in Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Belgian Sabena World Airlines,67
United States courts owe allegiance to the United States Congress.
Once Congressional intent is clear, it is that intent, not the intent of
the world community, that is authoritative in those courts. Section
67. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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403 appeared to challenge that truism. 68
Ultimately, after a great deal of discussion between the U.S. gov-
ernment representatives and the Reporters, Section 403 was changed
to make it clear that United States courts are required to evaluate rela-
tive interests but are not required to defer the exercise of jurisdiction
to a state having greater interests. The new section provided in part:
When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two
states are in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as
well as the other state's interests in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all
the relevant factors; Subsection (2) a state should defer to the other state
if that state's interest is clearly greater.
69
Floor debate at the closing session made it clear that the word
"should" in the last clause was intended to be hortatory, not
mandatory. In effect, the ALI returned to a functional comity princi-
ple without using the name.70 The long and acrimonious debate over
the content of section 403 could have been in large part avoided, had
the issues been analyzed initially in terms of an effort to identify the
authoritative source of the law to govern the resolution of concurrent
jurisdiction cases in U.S. courts.
But Section 403 did, in its original form, reflect other provisions in
the Restatement that overtly sought to characterize international law
as the authoritative source of decision in U.S. courts in certain rele-
vant cases. The most direct and controversial reference to the domes-
tic authority of customary international law appeared in section 135
(1), Tentative Draft No. 1.71 That section provided: "[a] rule of inter-
national law . . . that becomes effective as law in the United States
supersedes any ... inconsistent preexisting provision of the law of the
United States."' 72 This was so, according to the Reporters, not because
international law had this effect of its own force, but because it had
been part of English common law and was therefore one of the "laws
of the United States" that were incorporated under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution. 73 The draft went on to argue that because,
in the international community, customary law would supersede a
prior inconsistent treaty, "[b]y the same principle a rule of customary
68. See Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts or "There and Back Again", 25 VA. J.
INT'L L. 7, 43-48 (1984), reproducing a letter from Judge Wilkey to Professor Henkin discussing
the thrust of the Laker decision.
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403 (1987).
70. See generally Maier, supra note 68; especially at 40-41.
71. T. D. No. 1, supra note 56.
72. Id. at § 135(1).
73. Id. at 39.
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international law which developed after and is inconsistent with, an
earlier statute or international agreement of the United States should
prevail as the law of the United States."11
74
At another place, the Draft referred United States courts75 to the
traditional international sources for determining the norms of custom-
ary international law, 76 with the admonition that particular attention
was to be paid to the decisions of international tribunals. 77 The draft
conceded that lower courts were required to follow decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States, presumably even if these deci-
sions did not reflect the most recent holdings of an international tribu-
nal.78  No such concession was made for decisions of the federal
appellate courts, presumably freeing the federal district courts to de-
termine the content of customary international law on their own, even
in the face of contrary appellate precedent, in all instances where the
U.S. Supreme Court had not spoken. 79 The draft did provide that
United States courts should give "particular weight" to positions on
the content ,of international law taken by the United States govern-
ment "vis-a-vis other governments," but it did not suggest similar def-
erence to positions taken by the United States government in amicus
briefs on those same issues.
Taken together, these provisions of the Restatement (Revised) im-
plied that the international legal regime was accorded a much more
independent role in United States law than existing judicial decisions
had ever seriously suggested. More importantly, the heavy emphasis
on the added weight to be given to international adjudication in deter-
mining the content of international law impliedly undercut the role of
traditional judicial techniques of common law development and di-
luted the important safeguards of the common law principles of prece-
dent and stare decisis. The extent of that effect was unclear,
principally because the Restatement reporters failed to address directly
the authoritative source of international customary rules when they
74. Id. at § 135, comment (b). The Reporters acknowledged in the Draft that this had never
been authoritatively determined. Cf testimony of Professor Louis Henkin, infra text accompa-
nying note 120.
75. T.D. No. 1, supra note 56, at § 132.
76. Id. at § 102.
77. Id. at § 132(1).
78. Id. at § 132(2). It was not clear whether that rule would apply if the lower court found
that those Supreme Court decisions had been "superceded" by the interim development of a new
rule of customary international law in the international community. The Draft did not, however,
suggest a reason why more respect should be given to prior opinions of the United States
Supreme Court than was recommended for prior acts of Congress under these circumstances.
79. But see Henkin Testimony, supra note 37, at 57-58.
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are used as rules of decision by United States courts.80
More importantly, Section 135, by arguing that customary interna-
tional law would supersede Congressional acts, placed older Congres-
sional statutes in a kind of legal limbo. Henceforth, they would be
subject always to the uncertainty of a judicial determination that cus-
tomary international law had changed after the statutory enactment.
Additionally, older and well-established customary rules would never
have primacy over conflicting Congressional enactments while newly
developed custom would supersede Congressional statutes. If the
court found a change in customary international law to have occurred
after the enactment of the statute, then the presumption of interna-
tional legal validity that normally guides the interpretation of Con-
gressional statutes dealing with international matters would be taken
away.
It is exceedingly difficult to determine the precise moment in time
when a rule of customary international law changes or initially
emerges. The transformation of custom into customary law is really a
function of a changing state of mind in the community. It is for this
reason that the proposition that a state must violate international law
in order to change it is inaccurate. 8' Whether an international cus-
tomary rule prohibits a state act is a question that the lawyer must
answer at the time that the act is contemplated. If the state decides to
act and no other nation protests on legal grounds, the most that can be
said is that sometime between the last similar act and the current one,
community attitudes have changed and the legal force of the prior cus-
tom had disappeared. In such a situation, the inferences drawn about
community expectations by writers or courts that the act is legally
prohibited are proven wrong.
Conversely, if other states protest the act on legal grounds and the
acting state desists from its activity, the continued existence of the
prior customary legal prohibition is reaffirmed. The only time when it
can accurately be said that a state violates international law is when it
acts contrary to what the evidence suggests is a preexisting rule and
continues to act in the face of legal protests from other community
members. This is so, not because of some metaphysical quality of the
80. The Reporters sought to avoid the problem by a kind of bootstrap analysis which ran as
follows: The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution made both laws of the United States and
treaties "the supreme law of the land." If treaties were supreme by virtue of their inclusion in
this clause, then customary international law was supreme because it was "law of the United
States." This was so because customary international law was part of the "common law" of
England and the common law of England was part of the law of the United States.
81. See discussion in Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States Gov-
ernment to Violate Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913, 914-15 (1986).
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law, but because the protests reaffirm that the state acts contrary to
the legitimate expectations of the community. In other words, there is
a demand and response, but no accommodation.8 2 Then and only then
can the acting state be accurately said to have violated restrictions cre-
ated by the consent of nations. In all other instances, those restric-
tions will have been modified - a new version of the rule created -
by the demand-response-accommodation process that describes cus-
tomary law formation. State practice is still of fundamental relevance
in determining the existence of a rule of customary international law.
83
The contemporary legal standing of a customary rule is a function of
community opinion whose current state can be inferred only from the
contemporaneous interaction of community members.
Given the difficulties inherent in determining the exact moment in
time when a new customary rule had come into being and faced with a
suddenly increased reliance upon international adjudications to deter-
mine both the content of the customary norm and its temporal inci-
dence, the United States government faced a potential problem of
considerable scope and importance. Again, that problem was caused
by the failure of the Draft Restatement clearly to identify the authori-
tative sources of the international legal rules as employed in U.S. law.
Section 135 was removed from the Restatement after considerable
controversy.
One of the continuing issues concerning the status of customary
international law in the law of the United States is whether interna-
tional law is part of federal common law or, in some sense, a separate
body of custom whose rules are identified and articulated by the com-
mon law method. The latter position appears to have been the one
adopted in the early drafts of the Restatement (Revised).
84
Professor Louis Henkin, Chief Reporter for the Restatement ad-
dressed this issue directly in an article, International Law as Law in
the United States,85 prepared and published while the Restatement was
still in preparation. 86 Acknowledging that international law is incor-
porated into the law of the United States by the Constitution, he ar-
82. See McDougal, supra note 9, at 356.
83. For an excellent discussion of this point, see Charney, Customary International Law in
the Nicaragua Case: Judgment on the Merits, 1988 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 16.
84. See, e.g., T.D. No. 1, supra note 56 Introductory Note, ch. 1 at 17; compare, id. Introduc-
tory Note, ch. 2.
85. Henkin, supra note 46.
86. Professor Henkin has written more extensively on this issue than any other single United
States scholar and his earlier theoretical work was fundamental to the development of these
Restatement sections. It is for this reason that this article focuses principally on Professor Hen-
kin's writing, since it reflects the most significant and useful scholarly contributions to date in
this field.
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gued that it is not properly characterized as federal common law
because it is not "made" by judges:
Unlike federal common law, customary international law is not made
and developed by the federal courts independently and in the exercise of
their own law-making judgment. In a real sense federal courts find inter-
national law rather than make it, as was not true when the courts were
applying the "common law," and as is clearly not the case when federal
judges make federal common law pursuant to constitutional or legisla-
tive delegation.... In principle, the courts interpret law that exists inde-
pendently of them, law that is "legislated" through the political actions
of the governments of the world's states .... 87
Consequently, he concludes, customary international law is not
subordinate to existing treaties and United States statutes, as would be
the case if it were federal common law.a8 Rather, he concludes that
customary international law is incorporated as such into the law of the
United States:
We have also accepted customary international law as "laws of the
United States" for purposes of article III. Indeed, it is only by including
international law in "laws of the United States" that one can find a firm
basis for the supremacy of federal interpretations of international law, or
for federal jurisdiction over cases arising under international law.
89
Two years later, Professor Henkin continued the same theme.90
He directly attacked the dictum by the United States Supreme Court
in The Paquete Habana that customary international law provided a
rule of decision for United States courts only when there was "no
treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial deci-
sion."91 Citing historic precedent he went on to argue that customary
international law should have at least the same status as treaties and
should, therefore, have the benefit of the later in time rule with refer-
87. Henkin, supra note 46, at 1561-62.
88. Id. at 1563.
89. Id. at 1566. Expanding on similar conclusions, other writers have argued that customary
international law is part of the law of the United States that must be "faithfully executed" and
that therefore the President has no constitutional authority to violate customary international
law. See, e.g., Paust, The President Is Bound by International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 377
(1987); But see Weisburd, supra note 15. Under this view, the only basis for federal jurisdiction
over cases arising under international law is that the international legal regime is "law of the
United States." But federal common law-making authority is called into play when clear national
interests are not addressed by legislative or other acts. Consequently, the very fact that interna-
tional law rules deal with international affairs makes whatever international rules the courts may
apply "law of the United States" whether they accurately reflect the consent of the international
community or not. In other words, customary international law rules articulated and applied by
United States courts need not find their authoritative source in the international body politic in
order to raise federal questions. For the proposition that the framers never intended a broad role
for customary international law in United States law, see Jay, supra note 15, at 847-49.
90. Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion
and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987).
91. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899).
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ence to acts of Congress. 92 He concludes that the international legal
regime is the authoritative source for the content of customary inter-
national law in the United States:
International law as part of the law of the United States indeed is fre-
quently described as common law but only because of a tendency to de-
fine all law that is not legislative in origin as common law....
... [C]ourts do not create but rather find international law, generally
by examining the practices and attitudes of foreign states. Even the
practices and attitudes of the United States that contribute to interna-
tional law do not emanate from and respond to life in this society, as
does the common law....
Above all, the reasons that the common law bows to legislation are
inapplicable to international law. Common law is "inferior" to legisla-
tion because, under prevailing theories of government ... the legislature
is the principal lawmaking body; the courts, if they are to make law at
all, do so only temporarily and interstitially. But when courts determine
international law, they do not act as surrogates for the national
legislature.9
3
VI. THE NATURE OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
The passage above misses the point because it misconceives the
role of the courts as "creators" of common law. Professor Henkin is
correct when he argues that common law rules are subject to superses-
sion by legislation. But that is true because of the nature of those
rules, not because adjudication holds a status necessarily inferior to
legislation. The fallacy is in treating federal common law or, for that
matter, state common law, as if it were merely another body of rules
like legislation, but made by courts instead of by the legislature.
This error has its origins in early jurisprudential theory that in fact
perceived "The Common Law" as a "brooding omnipresence, ' 94 a set
of Platonic norms discoverable by right reason but not affected by any
act of the adjudicator. Under that concept, courts "found" principles
of common law from natural law, a kind of "heaven of legal con-
cepts. '' 95 By the early nineteenth century, however, a much more real-
istic view of the judicial role in common law "creation" had emerged.
Jurists no longer perceived law as "an eternal set of principles ex-
92. Treaties and Congressional enactments are of equal status under the Constitution.
Therefore, in case of a conflict, the later in time prevails. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,
194 (1988). See L. HENKIN, supra note 37, at 163-64.
93. Henkin, supra note 90, at 875-76.
94. The phrase, used pejoratively, is from Southern Pacific RR. v. Jenson, 244 U.S. 205, 222
(1917) (Holmes, J.).
95. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809
(1935).
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pressed in custom and derived from natural law."'96 Judges, rather,
came to realize that they, on their own authority, actually made com-
mon law, 97 not by writing rules but by deciding cases. Those decisions
were based, not on abstract individual notions of justice, but in large
part on the answer to the question whether the result reached made
objective sense for situations of the type in question.
98
The common law is not, in any sense useful to the modem lawyer,
solely or even primarily a body of rules; it is a decision-making pro-
cess. The rules describe the results of that process, they are not them-
selves the law. 99 In exercising its common "law-making" power, a
court applies general principles to specific fact situations to arrive at a
legal result. Common law rules describe a series of such past judicial
decisions.
Common law rules do not, of their own force, have legislative ef-
fect. It is the principle of precedent that makes them applicable to
future cases. The rules help the common law court to reach the same
result in similar cases in the future that it has in the past or, if it wishes
to deviate from prior results, to do so consciously by distinguishing or
"overruling" its prior decisions. The court uses the rule as a guide to
its future acts because the rule describes in the abstract the conglomer-
ate of past judicial decisions. Usually the court is faced with more
than one rule that describe the results in cases similar to the one before
it. Then, it selects among competing principles embodied in those
lines of decision; and applies the principle or rule selected to the case
at bar. This selection process is inherent in common law decision-
making. Courts are not slaves to "existing" common law rules; the
judge plays a policy-selecting role. °°
Common law rules inform the public, the bar and the court itself
about what the court has done in the past. It is not the past opinions
that the rules describe, but the legal results arrived at. Thus, the court
may either repeat the same result in a similar case or, if it finds the
earlier results that the rule describes to be incorrect, it may con-
sciously change that result.101 The future effect of common law rules
96. Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law, 1780-1820, in
V PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 287, 336 (1971).
97. See generally id.
98. See K. LLEWELLYN, How APPELLATE COURTS DECIDE CASES 1-28 (1951).
99. See supra text accompanying note 30.
100. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
101. Compare: "[T]he common law is an internal communication medium among judges,
presented to them by lawyers representing opposing parties, which permits the judge to select
among competing rules that version of the law which he wishes to apply to the given case." J.
SIGLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM 24 (1968).
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derives from the principle of precedent, not from any legislative force
attributable to the judicial power. 0 2
Because the authority of the common law rule derives principally
from its accuracy in describing past judicial decisions and the policy
selections that inform those prior decisions, it is clear that the legisla-
ture can substitute a legislative rule for the common law rule, directing
the court to decide differently in the future. The authority of that leg-
islation does not derive from some inherent superiority of legislation to
the common law. Rather, the superiority derives from the inherent
difference between the nature of the legislature's authority to an-
nounce social policies to be followed in future cases and the courts'
common law authority to decide individual cases by applying broad
principles to specific facts to arrive at a legal result. 10 3
Common law decision making is legitimate in the first instance
only when there is no legislation to indicate how the relevant policies
shall be applied. 104 Naturally, therefore, common law rules describing
past decisions have no legislative base and must give way in the future
after the legislature speaks. As Justice Cardozo put it:
The rule that fits the case may be supplied by the constitution or by
statute. If that is so, the judge looks no farther .... his duty is to obey.
The constitution overrides a statute, but a statute, if consistent with the
constitution, overrides the law of judges. In this sense, judge-made law is
secondary and subordinate to law that is made by legislators.' 0 5
Federal common law is no different in nature from other common law.
It is made by federal courts applying principles derived from the con-
stitutional structure, from the logic inherent in the federal system, or
from uniquely federal interests that the legislature has not addressed.
The authority to decide cases in this manner and, thus, to create the
raw material from which federal common law rules can be fashioned is
part of the judicial power conferred in Article III of the United States
Constitution.
The principles of international law are accessible to the federal
courts when they decide cases by the common law method because
such decisions engage the foreign relations power of the United
States,' 0 6 not because the authority of the international legal regime
102. Of course, courts sometimes do, in the purported exercise of common law power, write
rules that do not describe past results but that are intended to have in futuro effect. When acting
thus, the court does not exercise its judicial powers but functions, instead, as a legislature, pro-
jecting a policy for hypothetical future cases, not describing one from specific past decisions.
103. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 30-34 (1921).
104. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 78-79 (1951).
105. B. CARDOZO, supra note 103, at 14. (emphasis added)
106. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins Applied to International Law," 33 AM. J.
INT'L L. 740, 743 (1939); cf supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
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has somehow magically been incorporated into United States law. Of
course, courts find international legal principles by examining the
practice of states. Once the appropriate principles are identified, how-
ever, those principles are given domestic legal effect by the authority of
the court applying them in its traditional common law process, not by
some metaphysical omnipresence of the international legal regime.
Unless one denies the practical reality of territorial sovereignty, it can-
not be otherwise.
VI. THE MARIELITOS
The authoritative status of customary international law in United
States courts was a central issue in the cases involving efforts by the
American Civil Liberties Union to free some of the Mariel boatlift
Cubans from incarceration in federal prisons.10 7 Although the issues
were before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for almost five
years, it is the last incarnation of the case that is most relevant for
purposes of this discussion.
In 1980 approximately 125,000 Cubans left Mariel Harbor in a
"Freedom Flotilla," bound for the United States. Although most of
those involved sought to leave Cuba voluntarily, many were mental
incompetents or criminals whom Fidel Castro had taken out of Cuban
jails and asylums and sent along with the others. Few of the "Marie-
litos" had proper immigration documents. They were nonetheless per-
mitted to enter the country by U.S. immigration authorities as
"excludable aliens," treated constructively as being still outside the
borders. Almost all were paroled into U.S. society after an interview-
ing process. At the time of this case, 108 some 1800 were being held in
a Federal prison in Atlanta, Georgia: one group of approximately 400
who had never been paroled because they were mental defectives or
dangerous criminals, a second group because they had violated the
conditions of their paroles. The Atlanta Legal Aid Office and the Co-
lumbia University Law School Immigration Clinic, with the later
assistance of the American Civil Liberties Union, represented the de-
tainees in a class action for habeas corpus.
In 1981 the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
107. Garcia Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Garcia Mir v. Meese, 781
F.2d 1450 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Fernan-
dez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576 (1 th Cir. 1984); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426
(1Ith Cir. 1982).
108. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1985), sub nor Garcia Mir v.
Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986).
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Georgia began to review the legality of the incarcerations. The Attor-
ney General of the United States initiated a "Status Review Plan and
Procedures"'' 0 9 to determine the necessity of continued detention for
each member of the class.
The plaintiffs first argued that the continued detention violated the
U.S. Constitution. The 11 th Circuit, reversing Judge Marvin Schoob
of the Northern District of Georgia, found that the Cubans were ex-
cludable aliens subject therefore to detention if they were not immedi-
ately excluded. Furthermore, since parole of excludable aliens was
part of the admissions process, denying it, revoking it or restricting its
terms was not an abuse of discretion and did not violate the Cuban
detainees' constitutional rights."1 In a second case, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that because they were excludable aliens and therefore still
seeking legal admission to the United States, they had no Constitu-
tional rights with regard to their application nor to the procedures,
such as the Attorney General's review, incident to their seeking
admission. I'"
Having failed to establish a Constitutional ground for release,
plaintiffs turned to the customary international law of human rights,
arguing that their continued detention violated that customary law be-
cause it was prolonged and arbitrary. 1 2 This argument raised two
questions: whether the detention actually violated international
human rights law and, if it did, whether such a finding could support
an order directed to the executive branch to release the detainees.
The only evidence submitted at the trial level dealt with the con-
tent and applicability of the international law of human rights.
113
Judge Shoop found for the government on the international law is-
sue." 14 He concluded that although he believed that the international
109. For a description and review of this plan, see Garcia Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (1 1th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Marquez-Medina v. Meese, 475 U.S. 1022 (1986).
110. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 U.S. 576 (1984).
111. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1484 (11th Cir. 1984); cf Garcia-Mir v. Meese,
781 F.2d 1450 (11th Cir. 1986).
112. In the meantime, the Attorney General's Status Review Plan had ceased to operate
because of an agreement by the Castro government that Cuba would accept the return of more
than 2500 of the incarcerated Marielitos. The Cuban Government later refused to carry out the
agreement in retaliation for the anti-Castro broadcasts of a U.S. radio station that began opera-
tions, with the blessings of the Reagan administration, in early 1985.
113. Professor Henkin testified for the plaintiff concerning the content and effect of interna-
tional human rights law; the author did the same as a witness for the defendant United States
Government.
114. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 903 (N.D. Ga. 1985). He ruled also,
however, that most of the detainees had a constitutionally protected "liberty interest," created by
an "invitation" extended to the Marielitos and other "refugees" by President Carter when he
publicly pledged to continue "to provide an open heart and open arms to refugees seeking free-
dom from Communist domination .. " Id. at 896-901.
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norm prohibiting arbitrary and prolonged detention had been violated,
the acts of the Attorney General in detaining the Cubans were "con-
trolling executive acts" within the meaning of that language as used by
the Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana.'1 5 Therefore, he
concluded:
.. the President has the authority to ignore our country's obligations
arising under customary international law, and plaintiffs have failed to
establish that the Attorney General does not share in that power when
he directs the detention of unadmitted aliens. Accordingly, customary
international law offers plaintiffs no relief in this forum. Any relief in
this area must come from the President, the Attorney General, or
Congress. 116
On appeal, plaintiffs argued as they had in the District Court that
only an act by the President himself or, at least, an act pursuant to his
direct order, qualified as a controlling executive act, citing Section 131,
comment (c), and Section 135, Tentative Draft No. 1, Restatement
(Revised). The Court of Appeals rejected this argument on the
grounds that neither The Paquete Habana nor the Restatement (Re-
vised) supported it. 117 It pointed out that the supporting language had
been taken out of subsequent Restatement drafts. The court further
concluded that international law could be interdicted in the United
States by a controlling judicial opinion. It found such an opinion in
Jean v. Nelson,' 8 a similar case to that at bar involving Haitian de-
tainees, where the court had concluded that even an indefinitely incar-
cerated alien "could not challenge his continued detention without a
hearing."' 19
It is clear that in this case, the court explicitly rejected the view
that customary international law is at the apex of an authoritative hi-
erarchy of law in the United States. When any of the branches of the
government acts pursuant to a law-making power conferred on it by
the United States Constitution, the legal rules that result are authorita-
tive domestically whether or not they contravene customary interna-
tional law.
Only if the international legal community is treated for purposes of
United States internal law as a super-domestic legislature can custom-
ary international law be correctly argued to supersede prior inconsis-
115. See supra text accompanying note 40.
116. 622 F. Supp. 903-04.
117. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454-55 (1 1th Cir. 1986). The court of appeals
reversed the district court on the liberty interest issue as well as on grounds not relevant here.
118. 727 F. 2d 961 (11 th Cir. 1984); remanded to the District Court for further consideration
at 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
119. 727 F.2d at 975.
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tent domestic legislation or otherwise Consitutionally-valid executive
acts. Neither United States courts, nor the Restatement sections dis-
cussed above, 120 nor Professor Henkin claim this status for the world
community. In fact, during the District Court trial, Professor Henkin
appeared to modify, substantially, his endorsement of the proposition
that customary international law was authoritative within the United
States over prior congressional legislation. During cross examination
at the trial in the district court, the following colloquy took place dur-
ing Professor Henkin's cross examination by Ms. Barbara Tinsley,
U.S. Attorney:
Q. You have a particular opinion, I believe, if I can state it correctly,
that later in time customary rules of international law can supercede
prior statutes and executive acts; is that a correct statement of your the-
ory or your belief?
A. I have written on the subject and have said that I'm not sure why
our law should not be to that effect, but I have always considered it a
hypothetical question, and I can't say that I have reached a very firm
decision on that.
[Here the witness agreed that that conclusion had been included in the
blackletter statement of Section 135, Tentative Draft 1, RESTATEMENT
REVISED.]
Q. And then, after much discussion among your colleagues [in the
ALI], and I guess they didn't like it, and you reduced it to a comment
and labeled it as mere theory, is that correct?
A. Well, I stated both perspectives, the point being that the reason
why I took it out of the black letter is that the black letter has to get the
approval of the American Law Institute, and there were not enough peo-
ple in the Institute who wanted to take a position on it, so I withdrew
that from the context and I put it in essentially the Reporter's Notes
which are our own statement, where I state the argument on both sides.
Q. So that ....
A. It would probably be my view that if it came to - if that issue
arose in the United States, it is very likely to arise only in connection
with an older statute and a recent principle of law, and the only conse-
quence of my theory is it would mean that Congress would have to turn
around and tell us whether it really meant that old statute in light of the
change in international law, and that's why I think that is a plausible
position. But, as I said, I never had any occasion to really take it except
when I was trying to draft that. 12 1
120. See supra text accompanying notes 60 and 61.
121. Transcript of Proceedings in Garcia-Mir v. Smith (July 1, 1985), at 51-53. Professor
Henkin went on to reaffirm his belief that the position had not yet been determined but that there
was at least some United States practice to support it. Id. at 53-56.
Spring 1989]
Michigan Journal of International Law
VII. CONCLUSION
It seems clear, that, whatever may be the merits of the argument
that customary international law ought to be authoritative in the
United States, there is little if any evidence to support the proposition
that courts or other decision makers in this country are required to
give it primacy over otherwise lawfully created domestic legal norms
or otherwise constitutionally authorized executive acts. Therefore,
customary international law is no more a brooding omnipresence
hanging over the head of a United States decision maker than was the
Common Law to which Justice Holmes referred when he used that
famous characterization.
22
In other words, the government decision maker is always both a
decision maker and an advocate about the current content of a cus-
tomary international legal rule.' 23 To treat customary international
law as if it somehow exerts a force of its own to "bind" those who
participate in making it presents a logical conundrum that miscon-
strues the role of the national decision maker in the international law-
formation process. To treat the United States Constitution as if its
Framers intended, by inference, to permit the supersession of directly
conferred domestic law-making authority by the necessarily amor-
phous customary law-formation process of the world community
makes even less sense. It is fortunate that there is no discernible trend
toward that result in United States Constitutional decision making.
International law is nothing if it is not pragmatic. An interna-
tional legal system exists only to serve the perceived self-interests of
those groups of human beings who live within defined geographic bor-
ders and call themselves nation-states. Those perceived self-interests
include a recognition of the utility of accepting the short-term detri-
ments of complying with community norms in return for the long-
term benefit of maintaining a regularized and reasonably predictable
community system under law. 124 Any other choice is anarchy under
which even the strongest must suffer.
When scholars or statesmen claim more for this consentual inter-
national legal system than it can practically deliver at this relatively
early stage of its development, they do it a distinct disservice by lend-
ing credence to those who scoff at international law as a never-never
land peopled by impractical dreamers who are blinded to reality by
122. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917).
123. McDougal, supra note 9, at 357.




wishful thinking. If compliance with a given international community
rule is perceived by national decision makers as likely to damage seri-
ously a national self-interest and that damage is perceived to be more
threatening to that state than the danger.created by possible instability
in the community legal system, then that norm will not be treated as
authoritative within that nation state. Put another way, members of a
consentual legal system cannot logically consent to accept system-im-
posed detriments that they perceive will result in their own destruction
or serious injury. In those circumstances, the long term benefits of
preserving the system become meaningless. The detriment of the
trade-off required to support stability in the international system
would be just too great.
Encouraging the incremental acceptance of international law into
the domestic legal system is the best and surest way to strengthen its
role and to maintain its stability. Claiming too much for it or seeking
to endow it with too much authority too quickly can only be detrimen-
tal to the achievement of the goals that we all seek to serve.
1 25
125. See Bishop, International Law, 1906-1981, 75 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 1, 6 (1981).
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